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01 Introduction
In the ﬁeld of labor contracts, an important classiﬁcation is the one of monotone
and non–monotone contracts. Monotone contracts grant higher pay to workers
with higher effort input or output, respectively. Research on contract theory has
shown that there are various contractual relationships where monotone contracts
are not the optimal choice. Grossman and Hart (1983) present conditions for
monotonicity while the optimality of linear contracts as a variant of monotone
contracts is discussed by Christensen and Feltham (2005, ch.19), Hart and Holm-
ström (1987), or Holmström and Milgrom (1987). Although under certain con-
ditions, monotone contracts do not implement the theoretically optimal solution,
for practical purposes, non–monotone contracts are often deemed implausible.
In fact, monotone contracts are in frequent use, while there are only few non–
monotone contractual relations. The popularity of piece rates, target bonuses as
percentage of base salary, or variable ratios or quotas (with constant targeted level
of performance) are evidence of that.1
The widespread use of monotone contracts in practice has led many authors to
focus on these types of contracts only. Among others, much theoretical research
has been carried out in the LEN framework in agency theory where linear con-
tracts allow for analytical tractability.2 Incentive effects of linear contracts have
also been analyzed in various empirical studies. Many of these investigations re-
veal a positive correlation between monetary rewards and effort (see, e.g., Bailey
et al., 1998; Lazear, 2000; Sprinkle, 2000), whereas others do not ﬁnd any pos-
itive effects (Bonner et al. 2000; Jenkins et al., 1998). A positive relationship
between rewards and effort is also reported in experimental analyzes of contrac-
tual relationships (e.g., Fehr et al., 1993, 1998), though the evidence suggests that
its degree is quite sensitive to the institutional setting (e.g., van der Heiden et al.,
2001; Charness et al., 2004).3
Many of these experiments directly relate compensation to observable (and
1Although there are econometric studies indicating that non–monotone contracts are used,
these studies do not focus on individual contracts, but estimate certain parameters thereof. See
Prendergast (2002; pp. 1077) and the references therein for mixed results, i.e. some studies ﬁnd a
negative relationbetweenriskandincentives, whileothersﬁndapositiverelationornone. Leonard
(1990) reports a U–curve of compensation elasticity with respect to sales also suggestive of non–
monotone contracts.
2Linear contracts are a characteristic feature of the approach. See, among others, Dutta and
Reichelstein (2003), Feltham and Xie (1994) or Indjejikian and Nanda (1999). Recent examples
include Sabac (2007) or Feltham and Hofmann (2007).
3Models that try to account for the observed behavior include some form of other–regarding
preferences like a concern for relative payoffs (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ock-
enfels, 2000), some sort of reciprocity (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Levine, 1998; Falk and Fischbacher,
1998), or both reciprocity and efﬁciency concerns (Charness and Rabin, 2002).
1veriﬁable) effort inputs (see also Fehr et al., 2004; Falk and Gächter, 2002; Huck
et al., 2004), which violates a fundamental feature of agency–relationships, un-
observability of the agents’ effort choices. Due to this unobservability, in mod-
els of the principal–agent type, output is relevant for compensation, while input
only has an indirect inﬂuence. Accordingly, the studies conducted by Güth et
al. (1998) and by Anderhub et al. (2002) deal with incentive effects of output–
contingent pay based on monotone contracts. Keser and Willinger (2000) allow
for non–monotone contracts, but these contracts do not represent (incentive–)
compatible offers. Lukas (2007a) tests for the effects of incentive compatible
non–monotone contracts. He ﬁnds that the majority of workers (‘agents’) act
as income–maximizers and choose high instead of low efforts despite the non–
monotonicity of contracts.
The study by Lukas (2007a), however, neglects some aspects that are relevant
for judging the appropriateness of non–monotone incentive schemes: First, the
non–monotonicity is not explicitly mentioned in the contract (nor in the subjects’
instructions); second, agents are not informed about the set of contracts available
and are not allowed to reject contract offers; third, the game does not involve
repeated interaction between principals and agents.
This paper extends the previous research along these lines and analyzes rea-
sons for the observed popularity of monotone contracts. In the controlled envi-
ronment of the laboratory, principals can choose between a theoretically optimal
non–monotone and a theoretically sub–optimal monotone contract. Our results
demonstratethatagentsvirtually neverrejectcontractoffersandoftenchoosehigh
effort as intended by the principals. Interestingly, this behavior is robust against
the different variations of our experimental design, but is more pronounced un-
der the monotone contract. Although the agents’ behavior does not lead to higher
expectedpayoffs forprincipals underthe monotone contract, we observe thatprin-
cipals do not select the non–monotone contract in a signiﬁcant way. As such the
results highlight the delicate interplay between incentives, behavior, and perfor-
mance and show that conﬁning attention to monotone (if not linear) contracts is
clearly suboptimal from the principals’ perspective — a behavioral pattern we call
the ‘monotonicity puzzle’. From our point of view this puzzle can be resolved as
follows: Experiments with observable effort show a positive correlation between
effort and reward. If effort is not observable output is used to infer input and,
consequently, serves as a proxy for effort. Fairness considerations, which have
been identiﬁed in observable effort experiments, would then suggest monotone
contracts so that higher effort — proxied by output — leads to higher rewards.
As long as the theoretically optimal contract is indeed monotone (in outcomes),
the effort proxy will do just ﬁne. However, as soon as a non-monotone contract is
optimal the effort proxy leads to a suboptimal contract design. And this is what
shows up in our experiments. In contrast to Lukas (2007a), the contract feature
2‘monotone’ or ‘non–monotone’ was explicitly mentioned in our experimental de-
signwhileitwasnotinLukas’design. Lukas(2007a)reportsastatisticallysigniﬁ-
cant choice of the optimal non–monotone contract by principals — an observation
found to be robust against different variations of his experimental design — yet
we cannot ﬁnd statistical signiﬁcance for non–monotone contract choices in our
data.
Our ﬁndings contribute to the research on agency theory and on labor mar-
kets by demonstrating that non–monotone contracts are tolerated by agents, and
consequently may not be as implausible as they are often regarded to be. Our
observations on principals, however, might help to understand why this type of
contract is nevertheless rarely used in labor markets.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 includes the model guiding our
analyzes. In sections 3 and 4 we present the experimental design and derive our
hypotheses. Section 5 discusses the results on agents and principals and the ﬁnal
section concludes.
2 Outline of the model
The model underlying our experimental design is adopted from Lukas (2007b).
We consider a two–stage agency model with risk–neutral contracting parties. The
agent performs similar tasks in each stage and her actions (effort) et   {0,1},t =
1, 2 , which are unobservable to the principal, cause costs of C(et)=cet, c > 0.
The agent’s ﬁrst–stage action affects the outcome in both stages,t =1 andt =2. It
can therefore be considered as ‘strategic effort’. Effort in stage 2 affects only the
current stage and is considered as ‘operational effort’. We assume a binary output
distribution in each stage, xt  
 
xL, xH 
,t = 1, 2, such that four different output
sequences characterized by a ﬁrst–stage outcome and a second–stage outcome are
possible, (x1, x2)  
 
xL, xH 2. Higher effort inputs lead to high(er) probabilities
for high outcomes. Given the strategic complements property (Bulow et al., 1985)
of strategic and operational effort in Lukas’ model setup, low strategic effort in
stage 1 cannot be made up by (excessive) operational effort in stage 2. As the
principal desires high effort in both stages, he has to rely on incentive–compatible
output contingent payments. Let sij, i, j   {L,H}, denote the state contingent
payment on which the agent has a legal claim if she achieves outcome i in stage
1 and outcome j in stage 2. The strategic complements property drives the pay
structure. We are interested in the following two different, incentive–compatible,
pay structures:
sLL < sHL < sLH < sHH, (Y)
sLL < sHL < sHH < sLH. (X)
3PaystructureYismonotoneinthenumberofsuccesseswhileXisnon–monotone.
X is particularly interesting because a higher payment is given to an agent who
succeeds only once (in stage 2) than to an agent who succeeds in both stages. In
light of the rationality assumption inherent to the model and given the incentive
compatibility of the pay structures Y and X, any agent is expected to accept such
a contract and to subsequently exert high effort in both stages.
The set–up might be interpreted as follows. Consider an agent who is new
to a ﬁrm or in a certain position. Then one could think of the strategic effort in
stage 1 as the effort the agent has to exert in order to get acquainted with the work
environment and tasks and to learn about the speciﬁc requirements of the job. In
stage 2, the acquired skills are applied. In case the agent does not qualify properly
in stage 1 (e1 = 0), she cannot compensate her failure by spending comparably
higher operating effort. As such, learning–on–the–job effort and operating effort
are strategic complements. As a result, a low performance xL in stage 1 indicates
that a low effort might have been chosen and that a high outcome xH in stage 2 is
rather unlikely. If the principal intends to induce high effort in stage 2 (because
the agent’s effort is nevertheless sufﬁciently proﬁtable)it takes comparably higher
incentives than in a situation with xH being the ﬁrst–stage outcome. If the agent
then does accomplish xH in stage 2, she acquires a claim on a state contingent
payment that is higher than the payment resulting from successes in both stages.
A speciﬁc example would be a marketing manager who learns about consumer
tastes in stage 1 while already being in charge of the company’s key accounts.
The more she learns in stage 1 the more likely are high sales (xH) in stage 1
and stage 2. In case she does not meet the sales target in stage 1, the marketing
manager appears poorly informed about consumer tastes. High sales in stage 2
are then rather uncertain. Therefore it takes high incentives to induce high effort
in stage 2, and the state contingent payment sLH will be higher than sHH.
3 Design of the experiments
We test ﬁve different treatments of the sequential principal–agent game with ten
decision rounds each. The basic set–up is as follows: The ﬁrst mover (princi-
pal) has to choose between two similar, incentive compatible contracts X and Y.
Contract X is characterized by the pay structure given in X, whereas Y charac-
terizes Y’s pay structure. That is, contract X awards the highest payoff to the
output sequence {low, high} and contractY does so to the sequence {high, high}.
The contract choice determines the payoff for both the ﬁrst mover and the sec-
ond mover (agent) for every possible output sequence. The second mover’s effort
decision inﬂuences the probabilities of the different possible output sequences.
Our ﬁrst treatment (baseline) is labeled ‘no framing with selected contract in-
4formation’ (NFS). Here, an agent is matched with the same principal over the
whole ten rounds. The principal decides on a contract once and for all rounds
and the agent receives information only on the contract chosen by the principal,
i.e. agents are given a game–tree visualization of that contract containing prob-
abilities of success and respective payoffs for both players (see Figures 1(a) and
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(b) Contract Y (monotone)
Figure 1: Game trees for the contracts
The second treatment (‘framing with selected contract information’, FS) dif-
fers from the ﬁrst one only in that additional information about the contract type
(‘monotone’ or ‘non–monotone’, respectively) is given to the participants. In the
third treatment (‘framing with complete information’, FC), agents are informed
about the structure of both contracts, i.e. also about the one not chosen by the
principal. In the fourth treatment (‘framing with complete information, repeated
interaction’, FCR), agents receive the same information as in treatment FC, but
the pairs of principal and agent are randomly formed anew for each of the ten de-
cision rounds. The ﬁfth treatment (‘framing with complete information, repeated
interaction, and rejection opportunity’, FCRR) is basically the same as FCR, but
additionally includes the opportunity for agents to reject contract offers. Both
in treatment FCR and FCRR six participants, three principals and three agents,
formed a matching group and random matching before each round occurred only
within a matching group.
Testing the model in these ﬁve treatments is intended to serve the following
purposes: Treatment NFS establishes baseline results. In treatment FS, we inves-
tigate whether the explicit statement of the contract type has any impact on agents’
decisions. Note that in this treatment agents do not have information about the
5other contract, i.e. the one that is not selected by the principal, the only additional
information they receive is whether their contract is ‘monotone’ or not. Treat-
ment FC then controls for the impact of complete information about the set of
possible contracts on the agents’ and the principals’ decision. In other words, do
principals behave differently if agents know about the properties of all contracts
available to their principals? And how do agents respond? Treatment FCR allows
to control for possible reputation effects, since — other than in FC — agents re-
peatedly interact with different partners. Finally, in treatment FCRR, the option
to reject a contract offer is introduced in order to test whether agents use this op-
tion depending on the contract type and to determine its inﬂuence on principals’
behavior.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were given a presentation by one
of the experimentators. The presentation was the same for all treatments and con-
ductedbythesameexperimenter. Itincludedadetailedexplanationofthedecision
context, the game tree (without the relevant payoffs), and on how individual deci-
sions inﬂuence outcome probabilities and proﬁts. For the latter, participants were
guided through the decision tree for each of the two possible choices in period 1.
Then subjects were randomly assigned to their roles and to their seats in the lab-
oratory where they found written instructions.4 After reading the instructions and
during the course of the experiment, subjects could privately ask clarifying ques-
tions. They were neither allowed to ask questions in public nor to communicate
with other participants. All experiments were conducted via computers using the
zTree-software tool (Fischbacher, 2007). On the computer screen, subjects could
see their own decision(s), the outcomes of random draws by the computer, and
their payoffs (see Figure 2). While agents were informed about the principals’
decisions, principals could not observe the agents’ effort choices. In each round,
principals were only informed about their proﬁts and, in treatment FCRR about
the agent’s rejection decision. This corresponds to the fundamental assumption of
unobservable effort in agency models.
In treatments FCR and FCRR, subjects were randomly re–matched in match-
ing groups consisting of six participants. We made sure that no two participants
were matched with each other in two subsequent rounds. Subjects were informed
accordingly.
TheexperimentswererunattheMagdeburgLaboratoryforExperimentalEco-
nomics (MaxLab) in June 2006 and April 2007. A total of 220 graduate students
recruited from several courses took part in the experiment. The sample size was
19 pairs of subjects in each of the two treatments FSand FC, and 36 pairs (i.e. 12
matching groups) in each of the two treatments FCR and FCRR. Sessions lasted
for about one hour; there were no time–constraints imposed on subjects’ decision
4Complete instructions are included in the Appendix.
6Figure 2: Screenshot of input stage
making. All subjects were anonymously paid off after the experiment. No infor-
mation was given about the identity of other subjects. Average earnings were e
13.77.
4 Hypotheses
The output sequences (x1, x2)  
 
xL, xH 2 stochastically depend on the sequence
of effort inputs (e1, e2)   {0, 1}
2. The probabilities of achieving output sequence
(x1, x2) conditional on input sequence (e1, e2), Prob((x1, x2) | (e1, e2)) are iden-
tical in each treatment. The same holds for net payoffs under contract X and Y,
respectively. Probabilities and net payoffs are illustrated in Fig. 1 and explicitly
given in Tables 6 and 7 in Appendix A.
Since the production environment does not depend on the particular contract
chosen, we transform the non–monotone contract X into the monotone contractY








In addition, if a contract offer is rejected in treatment FCR, both principal and
agent have to settle with a ﬁxed payment of e 0.50 each and the decision round
ends with the agent’s rejection.
4.1 Agents’ decisions
By applying backward induction in expected payoffs to both contracts, we can
deduce our hypotheses. The following refers to the game trees given in Fig. 1.
4.1.1 Contract X
Starting in stage–two decision nodes, agents face the following decision under
contract X:
expected payoff income–maximizing
node no effort effort action
NEN 1.475 1.275 no effort
NEH 1.878 1.700 no effort
EN 1.575 1.675 effort
EH 1.819 1.811 (no effort)
Table 1: Contract X. Expected net payoffs to agent in stage 2 given stage 1 deci-
sion
Expected net payoffs as given in Table 1 can be used to determine the income–
maximizing strategy in stage 1 (decision node W). Since the expected payoff
when choosing ‘no effort’ (e 1.64) at this stage is lower than expected payoff
when choosing ‘effort’ (e 1.79), the income–maximizing strategy is to choose
‘effort’. In summary, income maximizing agents choose ‘effort’ in stage 1, and
‘effort’ given EN and ‘no effort’ given EH in stage 2. If an agent instead selects
‘no effort’ in stage 1, it is always payoff–maximizing to select ‘no effort’ in stage
2, however.
4.1.2 Contract Y
Again, starting with the stage–two decision nodes, agents face the decision under
contractY as shown in Tab. 2:
5It should be noted that contractY is still not strictly monotone in the number of high outcomes
but at least the sequence
 
xH, xH 





node no effort effort action
NEN 1.383 1.143 no effort
NEH 2.014 1.900 no effort
EN 1.395 1.407 (effort)
EH 2.047 2.143 effort
Table 2: Contract Y. Expected net payoffs to agent in stage 2 given stage 1 deci-
sions
Expected net payoffs as displayed in Tab. 2 can be used to determine the
income-maximizing strategy in stage 1. Since the expected payoff when choosing
‘no effort’ (1.64) at this stage is lower than the expected payoff when choos-
ing ‘effort’ (2.00), the income–maximizing strategy is to choose ‘effort’. Income
maximizing agents under contractY also choose ‘effort’ in stage 1, and ‘effort’ in
stage 2. And again, if an agent instead selects ‘no effort’ in stage 1, it is payoff–
maximizing to select ‘no effort’ in stage 2 as well.
Giventheexpectedpayoffsresultingfrompayoff–maximizingbehavior, agents
will not reject any contract offered. (Note that the rejection of a contract offer
yields e 0.50.)
The corresponding hypotheses regarding agents’ behavior are as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (Agents; Contract Acceptance/Rejection) Incomemaximizingagents
will never reject a contract offer made by principals.
Hypothesis 2 (Agents; Stage 1 Behavior) Income maximizing agents will select
‘effort’ in stage 1.
Hypothesis 3 (Agents; Stage 2 Behavior) Income maximizing agents will select
‘no effort’ in stage 2, if they selected ‘no effort’ in stage 1. They will select ‘effort’
in stage 2, given EN for contract X and given EH for contract Y.6
4.2 Principals’ decisions
To predict principals’ choices, one can easily verify that no contract dominates
the other in terms of ﬁrst–order stochastic dominance or second–order stochas-
tic dominance for any effort strategy selected by agents. Given the decisions of
income maximizing agents, the expected payoffs for principals selecting contract
6As the difference in expected payoffs in node EH for contract X is only e 0.008 and in EN
for contract Y is only e 0.012, we consider both possible choices as ‘payoff–maximizing’ in the
subsequent analysis.
9X is e 1.56 and for principals selecting contract Y is e 1.35. (The principal’s
decrease in expected surplus of e 0.21 associated with choosing Y instead of X
is exactly the increase of the agent’s expected surplus of e 0.21.) The hypothesis
for income–maximizing principals’ behavior then is as follows.
Hypothesis 4 Incomemaximizingprincipalswillalwaysselectthenon-monotone
contract.
Hypothesis 5 Income maximizing agents will never reject a contract offer by
principals.
Hypothesis 6 Income maximizing agents select effort in stage 1.
Hypothesis 7 Income maximizing agents select effort in stage 2, if they selected
effort in stage 1; they select no effort if they selected no effort in stage 1.
5 Results of the experiments
In this section we will ﬁrst present the analysis of the principals’ decisions and
then investigate the agents’ decisions. If not indicated otherwise, one–sided non–
parametric tests are used and differences are labeled as signiﬁcant if p   0.025
and are labeled as weakly signiﬁcant if 0.025 < p   0.050.
5.1 Principals’ behavior
We observe, over all treatments, that in about 53 percent of all cases principals se-
lect the non–monotone contract X. Treatment–speciﬁc numbers are illustrated
in Table 3 (treatments NFS, FS, FC) and Fig. 3 (FCR, FCRR), respectively.
Although the non–monotone contract X yields a higher expected payoff than the
NFS FS FC
(i) Number of X-choices 11 11 9
(ii) Total number of choices 20 19 19
Percentage (i) / (ii) 55.0 57.9 47.3
Table 3: Descriptive data on principals’ choices
monotone contract Y, principals do not choose contract X as often as expected.
Applying the binomial test to principals’ choices in treatments NFS, FS, and FC
reveals that principals do not select contract X in a statistically signiﬁcant way.
































Figure 3: Principals’ choices in FCR and FCRR
eight of the ten rounds in treatments FCR and FCRR. In both treatments the
frequency of choosing X is almost never signiﬁcantly different from 50 percent
(two–tailed, one–sample t–test). This leads to conclusion 1.
Conclusion 1 In contrast to Hypothesis 4, in all treatments principals do not se-
lect the non–monotone contract X in a statistically signiﬁcant way.
At ﬁrst sight, one could be tempted to think that principals concerned over
agents’ behavior at node EH might choose X not as often as predicted. At this
node, agents’ expected payoff from effort is 1.811, and the corresponding ex-
pected payoff from ‘no effort’ amounts to 1.819.7 But even if agents strictly prefer
‘no effort’ at this node, in terms of expected payoffs principals are still better off
with contract X (1.43) compared to Y (1.34). It follows that other motives must
account for observed principals’ behavior.
Another possible explanation is that principals are willing to sacriﬁce some of
their own payoff in order to reduce the inequality between their and the agents’
payoff. Recent theoretical and experimental work provide reasons for this as-
sumption (e.g. Fehr/Schmidt, 1999; Bolton/Ockenfels, 2000; Charness/Rabin,
7See also fn. 6.
112002). In our setting, however, choosing the monotone contract Y instead of the
non–monotone contract X even increases the payoff difference according to the
theoretical prediction (contract X: principal 1.56, agent 1.79; contract Y: prin-
cipal 1.35, agent 2.00). Considering agents’ actual choices does not change this
result for any of the ﬁve treatments.
In order to get a more detailed picture of principals’ behavior, we now turn to
an analysis of individual responses in treatments FCR and FCRR, where princi-
pals repeatedly decide on a contract. As they can only observe the outcomes of
random draws by the computer and the corresponding payments, they do not know
the agents’ effort choices. Inference from outcomes to action choices is limited to
knowing that high payoffs are more likely to be the result of high effort instead
of low effort. Table 4 illustrates the development of individual contract choices
contingent on payoffs realized in the previous round. Since we do not ﬁnd sys-
tematic differences in individual responses between the two contract types, the
table aggregates data over both contracts. In general, we observe a tendency to
(a) Treatment FCR
Response after round
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
payoff < maximum (‘lose’) 0.78 0.83 0.75 0.69 0.75 0.81 0.75 0.78 0.64
stay with contract 0.50 0.53 0.59 0.72 0.78 0.66 0.78 0.86 0.74
change contract 0.50 0.47 0.41 0.28 0.22 0.34 0.22 0.14 0.26
payoff = maximum (‘win’) 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.22 0.36
stay with contract 0.75 0.83 1.00 0.73 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92
change contract 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.27 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
(b) Treatment FCRR
Response after round
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
payoff < maximum (‘lose’) 0.72 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.89 0.83 0.61 0.83 0.81
stay with contract 0.58 0.54 0.72 0.59 0.66 0.73 0.68 0.60 0.79
change contract 0.42 0.46 0.28 0.41 0.34 0.27 0.32 0.40 0.21
payoff = maximum (‘win’) 0.28 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.17 0.39 0.17 0.19
stay with contract 0.80 0.88 0.57 0.86 0.75 1.00 0.79 1.00 1.00
change contract 0.20 0.12 0.43 0.14 0.25 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00
Table 4: Principals’ individual responses to observed payoffs
stay with the contract type chosen in the previous round. This holds true for both
events (‘winning’ and ‘losing’). If we ﬁnd a change of behavior, this is most
12likely in the case of losing. In treatment FCR, particularly, the tendency to stay
with the previous contract becomes more pronounced over time. The above ﬁnd-
ings indicate that principals’ behavior is dominated by inertia and additionally
guided by a form of the ‘Win–Stay–Lose–Change’ learning heuristic (cf. Novak
and Siegmund, 1993). Over the ten rounds of our experiment, this type of indi-
vidual ‘learning’ does not result in a change in aggregate behavior, however.
There are no signiﬁcant differences in principals’ behavior between the treat-
ments. Neither the presence nor the absence of a statement of the contract type,
neither repetition of the decision process by the agent nor by the principal and
neither the presence nor the absence of agents’ opportunity to reject a contract
proposal has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on principal’s contract choice. As our baseline
treatment NFS is comparable to Lukas’ (2007a) treatment FP(framing with prin-
cipal8), our data do not reinforce his ﬁnding of a statistically signiﬁcant choice of
non–monotone contracts when the contract type is not explicitly mentioned. Yet
our results show that the choice of the non–monotone contract X does not remain
signiﬁcant against different variations of the experimental design which is at odds
with theoretical predictions.
5.2 Agents’ behavior
In treatment NFS, there are 11 agents confronted with contract X (X–agents), and
9 agents confronted with contract Y (Y–agents). In FS, the respective numbers
are 11 X–agents and 8 Y–agents and in treatment FC, there are 9 X–agents and
11 Y–agents. In treatments FCR/FCRR, each agent faces contract X on average
5.5/5.6 times and contractY on average 4.5/4.4 times, respectively. The following
analysis distinguishes between X–agents and Y–agents.
5.2.1 Payoff–maximizing behavior
Our ﬁrst hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) is related to agents’ contract acceptance deci-
sions in treatment FCRR. Of the 183 times that principals offer (non–monotone)
contract X, only one offer is rejected; contract Y (177 offers) is never rejected
by agents. Apparently, the expected payoff is high enough under either contract
given the intended effort strategy to dominate the certain payoff of e 0.50 follow-
ing contract rejection. Conclusion 2 follows immediately.
Conclusion 2 In line with Hypothesis 1, in treatment FCRR agents do not reject
contract offers.
8In Lukas’ (2007a) study, framing refers to presenting the decision problem in a labor relation-
ship context.
13In order to analyze decisions within and between treatments and contracts, we
determine the relative frequency of individual income–maximizing decisions per
contract type and round (in treatments FCR and FCRR the frequency refers to
matching groups9). The frequencies obtained as the number of individuals who
show income–maximizing behavior over the total number of individuals or as the
averages of the twelve matching groups’ percentage calculations, respectively, are
illustrated in Figure 4.
(a) Contract X, Stage 1 (b) Contract Y, Stage 1
(c) Contract X, Stage 2 (d) Contract Y, Stage 2
Figure 4: Frequencies of income–maximizing agent’s behavior
Table 5 shows the number of rounds in which we observe a signiﬁcant10 ma-
jority of subjects (or matching groups) displaying income–maximizing behavior.
In only 20 percent of all cases (10 rounds out of 10 rounds   5 treatments)
we ﬁnd signiﬁcant income–maximizing behavior for contract X in stage 1. This
number decreases to 8 percent in stage 2. For contract Y, the respective numbers
are 36 percent in stage 1 and 26 percent in stage 2. This leads to the following
9Recall that in these two treatments, principals choose contracts anew in each round and, thus,
the number of agents in each matching group facing contract X or Y might change over time.
Accordingly, we calculated the frequency for each matching group based on the actual number of
agents facing the respective contract type.
10We applied Binomial tests and t–tests for FCR and FCRR, respectively.
14(a) Contract X
Stage NFS FS FC FCR FCRR
1 1 (1) 4 (0) 0 (0) 3 (1) 2 (0)
2 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 3 (3)
1+2 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
(b) Contract Y
Stage NFS FS FC FCR FCRR
1 3 (3) 2 (1) 0 (0) 7 (7) 6 (5)
2 1 (1) 3 (3) 0 (0) 4 (3) 5 (2)
1+2 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 2 (0) 2 (1)
Table 5: Number of rounds with at least weakly signiﬁcant income–maximizing
behavior (no. of signiﬁcant cases in parentheses)
conclusions:
Conclusion 3 In contrast to Hypothesis 2, only a minority of subjects maximizes
their incomes and selects ‘effort’ in stage 1.
Conclusion 4 At stage 2, we observe only a small number of subjects behaving
in line with Hypothesis 3.
Over the two stages, we do not observe any signiﬁcant income maximizing
behavior for contract X, while for contract Y in at least 5 of the 50 cases subjects
maximize their incomes. This observation led us to analyze possible differences
between the two contract types.
5.2.2 Differences between contracts
Figure 5 displays the average frequency of income–maximizing decisions over the
two stages (stage 1+2) for contracts X and Y. Applying a two-tailed  2–test on
individual data (and a Mann–Whitney–U–test on matching groups) reveals that
contract Y performs signiﬁcantly better (in terms of income–maximization) than
contract X in 14 of the 50 cases (10 rounds   5 treatments). Similar holds true for
the single stages, the respective number is 6 for stage 1 and 9 for stage 2.11 Ana-
11Our observations imply that the maximin–criterion does not provide a complete explanation.
To see this, note that for X and Y, contract rejection yields e 0.50 and contract acceptance (based
on the maximin–criterion) yields a payoff of e 0.90. To ensure this payoff, agents must choose
‘no effort’ in stages 1+2. Given the observed differences in behavior at stages 1+2, there must
be additional inﬂuences that guide subjects’ behavior here. At stage 2 (ignoring behavior in stage
1), the maximin–criterion and income–maximization coincide for contract X, but not for contract
Y. We ﬁnd an increase of income–maximizing behavior under contract Y, however, which even
contradicts the maximin explanation.
15Figure 5: Frequency of income–maximizing decisions for the two contract types
in stages 1+2 in the different treatments
lyzing behavior aggregated over the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds and over the last ﬁve rounds
reveals a higher share of income–maximizing behavior under the monotone con-
tract Y than under the non–monotone contract X from the ﬁrst rounds on. This
difference in behavior between contracts seem to increase over the rounds.
The previous result might suggest that, from a principal’s point of view, con-
tractY is preferable since this contract induces ‘effort’ more often than contract X
does (see ﬁgure 5 and table 5). This, however, is not the case, as the above result
does not carry over to payoffs. In FS, FCR, and FCRR, contract X still generates
a signiﬁcantly higher payoff to principals than contract Y (p < 0.07, two-tailed
exact Mann–Whitney–U test) given observed choices by the agents. In contrast,
principals do select contractY more often than predicted.
In order to ﬁnd an explanation for observed agents’ decisions, we investigate
possible differences between treatments.
5.2.3 Treatment Differences
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences regarding income–maximizing behavior at stages
1+2 for contract X between treatment NFS on the one hand and treatments FCR
and FCRR on the other (p < 0.05, two-tailed exact Mann–Whitney–U test). In
particular the combination of repetition and complete information signiﬁcantly
increases income maximizing behavior. Ceteris paribus, non–monotone contracts
perform the better the less often agents (employees) interact with the same princi-
pal. Interestingly, this effect is more pronounced in the early rounds of the exper-
iments. This suggests that the effect results from anticipation rather than from ex-
perience. More detailed investigations demonstrate that the observed differences
16in stage–1+2 behavior are mainly caused by differences in stage–2 behavior. Fig-
ure 6 presents the average individual frequency for each treatment and contract
type for stage 1, stage 2, and stages 1+2.
(a) stage 1 (b) stage 2
(c) stages 1+2
Figure 6: Frequency of income maximizing behavior over treatments
What do treatment differences teach us about the appropriateness of non–
monotone contracts? First of all, we do not ﬁnd treatment differences for the
monotone contract Y. As intuition would suggest the presence of an inferior al-
ternative from the agents’ point of view — the non–monotone contract X — does
not signiﬁcantly change their behavior, and it does not matter whether they repeat-
edly interact with principals or whether they are allowed to reject contract offers.
Turning to the non–monotone contract, treatment differences exist between the
NFS treatment and both the FCR and FCRR treatment. Note that in the latter two
treatments an agent interacts with the same principal less often than in the former
treatment. As employment relationships usually feature repeated performance ap-
praisals and corresponding bonus payments, non–monotone contracts are likely to
perform worse than monotone ones based on our results. As such they add support
for the prevalence of monotone contracts.
176 Conclusion
Theoretical research in labor economics and contract theory is often restricted
to monotone or linear contracts, presumably because of the practical popularity
of these types of contract. Such a conﬁnement, however, neglects the fact that
in many cases non–monotone contracts implement optimal incentive structures.
Therefore, more insights into the behavioral effects of non–monotone contracts
are needed.
In this paper, we test incentive–compatible monotone and non–monotone con-
tracts in a setting where principals should choose the non–monotone one. We
observe more income–maximizing agents under the monotone contract than un-
der the — strategically equivalent — non–monotone contract. Nevertheless, even
with agents’ higher efforts under the monotone contract, principals’ expected pay-
offs remain lower than under the non-monotone contract. In contrast, we ob-
serve the ‘monotonicity puzzle’, that is about every second principal chooses the
monotone contract. Ruling out different explanations by our treatment design and
comparing our data with results from Lukas (2007a), the experimental ﬁndings
suggest that principals seem to prefer monotonicity because they proxy observ-
able outcomes with unobservable effort which leads to a monotone contract as the
highest possible output is associated with the highest possible effort. Clearly this
output–effort heuristic results in suboptimal contract design if incentive compati-
bility calls for non–monotone contracts. Furthermore, given that the theoretically
optimal non–monotone contract is chosen, it performs worse if there is repeated
interaction. Thus, our paper provides one possible experimental explanation for
the popularity of monotone contracts in real–world labor markets.
A Appendix A: Tables
effort output sequence  
xL, xL   
xH, xL   
xL, xH   
xH, xH 
(0, 0) 0.463 0.264 0.138 0.136
(0, 1) 0.402 0.200 0.198 0.200
(1, 0) 0.110 0.344 0.090 0.456
(1, 1) 0.066 0.136 0.134 0.664
Table 6: Probabilities of net payoffs
18contract contract
XYXY
output seq. 2nd mover (agent) 1st mover (principal)  
xL, xL 
0.90 0.90 0.60 0.60  
xH, xL 
1.30 1.30 1.20 1.20  
xL, xH 
3.40 3.00 1.20 1.60  
xH, xH 
3.00 3.40 1.80 1.40
Table 7: State contingent payoffs (in e) under different contracts
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